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NOTES 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S EXCEPTION TO 
DISCHARGE FOR DEBTS ARISING FROM 
WRONGFUL CONDUCT 
INTRODUCTION 
While bankruptcy is intended to relieve the honest debtor,1 the 
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) prevents the discharge of debts in certain 
situations where the debtor’s actions are less than ethical.2 Section 
523(a)(6) of the Code does not allow a debtor to discharge any debt “for 
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the 
property of another entity.”3 The case law concerning the interpretation of  
§ 523(a)(6) is not clear and in 2007, the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois noted a circuit split over the requirements for 
the dischargeability of intentional breaches of contract in bankruptcy 
proceedings. The bankruptcy court noted that there is disagreement between 
the circuits over whether § 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct for a debt to 
be nondischargeable.4 While the text of § 523(a)(6) clearly requires a 
willful and malicious injury,5 the Ninth and Fifth Circuits are divided as to 
whether tortious conduct is required for an intentional breach of contract to 
be nondischargeable.6 In the Ninth Circuit, for a breach of contract “to be 
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) . . . [it] must be accompanied by 
some form of tortious conduct that gives rise to willful and malicious 
injury.”7 The Fifth Circuit, however, “holds that any breach of contract is 
nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury if the debtor either 
intended to injure the other party to the contract by breaching it or if injury 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915). 
 2. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006). 
 3. § 523(a)(6). 
 4. Tortious conduct is “[a]n act or omission that subjects the actor to liability under the 
principles of tort law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (9th ed. 2009). 
 5. § 523(a)(6). 
 6. Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No. 
07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008). In addition to the split between 
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth and Sixth Circuits are also split through unreported 
decisions. Compare In re Best, 109 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2004) (tortious conduct is necessary for a 
debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(6)(a)) with Sanders v. Vaughn (In re Sanders), No. 99-
6396, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5763 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2000) (tortious conduct is not necessary for 
a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(6)(a)). 
 7. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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to the other party was substantially certain to result from the breach; 
tortious conduct is not required.”8 
Part I of this note will begin with an overview of the circuit split and its 
origination out of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger.9 This overview will commence with a discussion of 
Geiger, then analyze the competing interpretations developed by the Ninth 
Circuit’s In re Jercich decision,10 and the Fifth Circuit’s In re Williams 
decision.11 Part I will conclude with a brief explanation of Wish Acquisition, 
L.L.C. v. Salvino,12 a bankruptcy case that noted the circuit split. Part II of 
this note discusses the role of state regulation in the application of federal 
bankruptcy law, specifically the § 523(a)(6) exception. Part III will 
conclude the note with an analysis of the relevant issues and a 
recommendation that the Ninth Circuit rule be adopted to resolve the circuit 
split. The Ninth Circuit rule should be adopted because it is more protective 
of debtors, more in line with the legislature’s intent concerning the 
Bankruptcy Code, and is less susceptible to abuse by creditors or debtors. 
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Geiger gave rise to a circuit split 
because the case merely addressed the issue of whether reckless or 
negligent conduct could lead to a debt being nondischargeable.13 The Court 
did not address the issue of what kind of intentional conduct was necessary 
to invoke the § 523(a)(6) exceptions.14 Since the Court did not address what 
constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6), the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits developed competing interpretations.15 In 2007, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the circuit 
split and determined that the Ninth Circuit’s rule requiring tortious conduct 
for a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) should be applied in the 
Seventh Circuit.16 
A. KAWAAUHAU V. GEIGER 
The circuit split recognized in Salvino arose out of competing 
interpretations of the Geiger decision that determined the scope of  
§ 523(a)(6).17 The Court held that “a debt arising from a medical 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 588 (citing Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re 
Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9. 523 U.S. 57 (1998). 
 10. 238 F.3d 1202. 
 11. 337 F.3d 504. 
 12. 373 B.R. 578. 
 13. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206; In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 510. 
 16. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 581.  
 17. See generally Geiger, 523 U.S. 57. 
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malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct,” was 
dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the plaintiff was not the victim of a 
willful or malicious injury.18 This suit arose when a plaintiff had her right 
leg amputated below the knee after receiving treatment from her doctor for 
a foot injury.19 The jury found the defendant liable for malpractice, and he 
attempted to avoid the judgment by petitioning for bankruptcy.20 In 
response to the defendant’s bankruptcy petition, the plaintiff requested that 
the bankruptcy court hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable 
because the judgment originated from a willful and malicious injury and 
was thus a debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).21 
The bankruptcy court initially determined that the defendant’s conduct 
was willful and malicious since his “treatment fell far below the appropriate 
standard of care.”22 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that the debt was nondischargeable, but the appellate court 
reversed and determined that the malpractice debt was dischargeable.23 The 
court of appeals reversed the district court’s determination because the  
§ 523(a)(6) exception from discharge “is confined to debts based on what 
the law has for generations called an intentional tort.”24 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
the court of appeals and determined that willful, in the context of  
§ 523(a)(6), modifies injury, “indicating that nondischargeability takes a 
deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act 
that leads to injury.”25 The Court justified a narrow reading of the statute by 
asserting that if Congress had intended to “exempt debts resulting from 
unintentionally inflicted injuries,” explicit language to make that meaning 
clear would have been used.26 Further, the structure of the statute mirrors 
that of intentional torts, in that “[i]ntentional torts generally require that the 
actor intend ‘the consequences of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’”27 If 
the Court adopted a broad reading of § 523(a)(6), it would have expanded 
the scope of the statute to cover many situations where “an act is 
intentional, but injury is unintended,” including a knowing breach of 
contract or a car accident.28 This type of broad reading would be 
incompatible with the established notion that “exceptions to discharge 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 59. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 59–60. 
 21. Id. at 60. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Id. at 61 (emphasis in original). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 61–62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1964)). 
 28. Id. at 62. 
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should be confined to those plainly expressed.”29 Finally, if the Court 
adopted a broad understanding of willful and malicious it would have 
rendered § 523(a)(9), which exempts debts from injuries or deaths arising 
from drunk driving to be discharged, superfluous.30 Based on these factors, 
the Court unanimously determined that § 523(a)(6) should be interpreted 
narrowly, so that the statute only applies to a deliberate or intentional 
injury. 
In deciding Geiger, the Supreme Court clearly established that  
§ 523(a)(6) exempted only deliberate or intentional injuries, and does not 
cover intentional acts that result in injury.31 However, the Court did not 
address the issue of whether the debtor’s conduct must be tortious to be 
exempted under the statute. Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits address this 
issue, but are split on whether the debtor’s conduct must be tortious in 
addition to willful and malicious for a debt to be nondischargeable. 
B. PETRALIA V. JERCICH 
After the Supreme Court in Geiger addressed one aspect of the  
§ 523(a)(6) exception, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
tortious conduct is required to invoke the exception. Its decision is the basis 
for the Salvino decision. The dispute in Jercich arose when Jercich, the 
owner of a real estate company, failed to pay one of his employees as 
required under an employment contract.32 The employee sued Jercich 
seeking damages.33 The state court found in favor of the employee and 
while the appellate decision was pending, Jercich filed for bankruptcy.34 
The employee initiated proceedings to except the judgment from discharge 
under § 523(a)(6).35 
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found for Jercich and determined that 
the debt was dischargeable.36 The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision because “where a debtor’s conduct constitutes 
both a breach of contract and a tort, the debt resulting from that conduct 
does not fit within § 523(a)(6) unless the liability for the tort is independent 
of the liability on the contract.”37 The appellate panel determined that since 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 33. Id. at 1204. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 243 B.R. 747, 751 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 238 
F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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there was not a tort independent from the contract, the debt was not exempt 
from discharge under § 523(a)(6).38 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the appellate panel and held “that to be 
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), a breach of contract must be 
accompanied by some form of tortious conduct that gives rise to willful and 
malicious injury.”39 In order for a breach of contract to become tortious 
conduct it must “violate[] an independent duty arising from principles of 
tort law.”40 Jercich’s nonpayment of wages to the employee when he had 
the ability to do so was tortious conduct because it violated California 
law.41 The Ninth Circuit determined that the “deliberate or intentional 
injury” standard established by the Supreme Court in Geiger necessitates 
tortious conduct, in addition to a “willful and malicious injury,” for a debt 
to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).42 
C. WILLIAMS V. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL 
WORKERS LOCAL 520 
While the Ninth Circuit determined that tortious conduct was required 
for a debt to be deemed nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6),43 the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the tortious conduct requirement and instead limited its 
inquiry to a determination of whether the debtor’s conduct was willful and 
malicious.44 The Fifth Circuit held in Williams “that for a debt to be 
nondischargeable, a debtor must have acted with objective substantial 
certainty or subjective motive to inflict injury.”45  
The conflict in Williams arose out of a violation of a collective 
bargaining agreement and a subsequent agreement between an electrical 
contractor and a union for electricians. Williams, the electrical contractor, 
hired electricians for a commercial project who concealed their union 
affiliation and went on strike.46 After being unable to hire non-union 
electricians, Williams entered into a collective bargaining agreement with 
the Union.47 Finding trouble with the union electricians, Williams, in 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement, hired non-union 
electricians.48 In response to the violation, the Union initiated a grievance 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Id. (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 
1994)). 
 41. Id. at 1207. 
 42. See id. at 1205. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 510 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 45. Id. at 508–09 (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. Id. at 507. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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against Williams.49 The dispute was resolved when Williams agreed to use 
only union electricians for commercial projects.50 The new agreement was 
subsequently violated and the Union sought damages from both Williams’ 
original violation of the collective bargaining agreement and his later 
violation of the new agreement.51 Williams then filed for bankruptcy, and 
the Union sought to have the debts under the collective bargaining 
agreement and the subsequent agreement excepted from the discharge under 
§ 523(a)(6).52 
The bankruptcy court determined that the debts under the collective 
bargaining agreement were nondischargeable because they “arose from 
willful and malicious injury.”53 After the judgment was affirmed by the 
district court,54 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that tortious conduct is not required for a debt to be 
nondischargeable.55 In rejecting the requirement of tortious conduct, the 
circuit court condensed the test for a willful or malicious injury “into a 
single inquiry of whether there exists either an objective substantial 
certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm on the part of the 
debtor.”56 This test requires that “a debtor must commit an intentional or 
substantially certain injury in order to be deprived of a discharge.”57 Under 
this rule, “the dischargeability of contractual debts under [§] 523(a)(6) 
depends upon the knowledge and intent of the debtor at the time of the 
breach.”58 
Though the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination 
that tortious conduct is not required for a debt to be nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(6), it did not fully affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court.59 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s determination that the 
damages resulting from Williams’ violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement were nondischargeable.60 Williams may have acted intentionally 
in hiring non-union electricians, but he was not intending to harm the Union 
through this action; he was acting to finish the project and to save his 
business.61 The Union did not introduce any evidence that when Williams 
breached the collective bargaining agreement he “was substantially certain 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 508. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 510 (citing Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 823 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 56. Id. at 509 (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 510. 
 59. Id. at 513. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 510. 
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the Union would sustain a blow to its prestige and its ability to uphold its 
contracts.”62 Since there was no showing that Williams intended or was 
substantially certain to cause injury to the Union through his violation of 
the collective bargaining agreement, the debt was dischargeable.63 
The circuit court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination 
that Williams’ violation of the agreement led to nondischargeable 
damages.64 It is well established that “[f]ailure to obey a court order 
constitutes willful and malicious conduct, and a judgment against a defiant 
debtor is excepted from discharge.”65 Since Williams failed to follow the 
court order, his conduct was at least substantially certain to cause injury to 
the Union and therefore the damages resulting from his breach of the 
agreement were nondischargeable.66 This ruling interprets Geiger to mean 
tortious conduct is not required to invoke the § 523(a)(6) exception to 
discharge, and instead only requires conduct that was intentionally 
undergone, or substantially certain, to cause injury.67 
D. WISH ACQUISITION, L.L.C. V. SALVINO 
The Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s debate concerning the requirement of tortious 
conduct in the § 523(a)(6) exception has influenced other courts not within 
their jurisdiction. For example, in Wish Acquisition L.L.C. v. Salvino, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois sided with the Ninth 
Circuit’s determination that tortious conduct was required to invoke the  
§ 523(a)(6) exception.68 In this case, Salvino, the debtor, owed Wish 
Acquisition (Wish), his former employer, debts that were nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(6) for the intentional breach of his employment contract.69 
The conflict arose after Wish acquired Salvino’s medical practice and the 
practice subsequently defaulted on its loans.70 When Wish acquired the 
practice, it entered into an employment contract with Salvino which 
provided that Wish would “forgive all but $1.5 million of Salvino’s 
personal guaranty of the bank loan” in exchange for Salvino’s medical 
services.71 Salvino, before filing for bankruptcy, breached his employment 
contract by seeking other employment, making him liable to repay the $1.5 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 511. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 513. 
 65. Id. at 512 (citing PRP Wine Int’l v. Allison (In re Allison), 176 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1994)). 
 66. Id. at 513. 
 67. See id. at 509. 
 68. Wish Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Salvino, 373 B.R. 578, 581 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, No. 
07-C-4756, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 582. 
 71. Id. at 583. 
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million under a liquidated damages provision in the employment contract.72 
The court determined that Salvino’s debts were dischargeable because Wish 
was unable to show that Salvino’s intentional breach of contract resulted in 
a willful and malicious injury.73 
In deciding this case, the bankruptcy court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
rule that “the willful and malicious injury exception [of § 523(a)(6)] applies 
only to claims arising from tortious conduct, not from simple breaches of 
contract.”74 The first reason the court gave in deciding to adopt the Ninth 
Circuit rule requiring tortious conduct was due to the use of the phrase 
“willful and malicious injury” in § 523(a)(6).75 Using the terms “willful and 
malicious” implies that the exception is limited to tortious conduct.76 
Therefore, “only debts arising from the sort of conduct that the common 
law discourages by punitive damages” would be nondischargeable.77 
Second, the court stated that before § 523(a)(6) was enacted, there was a 
willful and malicious injury exception from the discharge of debts that 
applied only when tortious conduct was present.78 Since Congress enacted  
§ 523(a)(6) with the willful and malicious standard, the court presumed that 
Congress meant to continue the practice of limiting the application of the 
exception to tortious conduct.79 Third, the court concluded that if a broad 
understanding of willful and malicious conduct was adopted under  
§ 523(a)(6), it would include debts generally discharged in bankruptcy.80 
Finally, the court reasoned that if all intentional breaches of contract were 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), then it would come into conflict with  
§ 365 of the Code.81 Section 365 encourages, in certain circumstances, 
intentional breaches that will generally harm the other party.82 Therefore, if 
§ 523(a)(6) did not require tortious conduct, the Code would punish 
conduct that it encourages elsewhere.83 
In this case, Salvino’s breach of his employment contract was not a 
willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) since the breach itself was 
not tortious.84 Salvino owed Wish $1.5 million,85 but this money was 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See id. at 582–84. 
 73. Id. at 581. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 589. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id.; see also In re Barton, 465 F. Supp. 918, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (limiting willful and 
malicious injury “to cases sounding in tort, not in contract”). 
 79. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 590. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 591. 
 82. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
 83. Salvino, 373 B.R. at 591. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 586–87. 
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contract debt and did not arise from an independent violation of tort law.86 
The breach was not tortious because the contract was a private agreement 
and an intentional breach of contract does not give rise to liability under tort 
law.87 Additionally, since § 523(a)(6) is not based on contract principles and 
instead is grounded in tort law, “[i]t is designed to compensate the injured 
party for the injury suffered while not allowing the debtor to escape liability 
for a willful and malicious injury by resort to the bankruptcy laws.”88 Since 
the purpose of § 523(a)(6) is to compensate an injured creditor, “the 
appropriate measure for non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6) is an 
amount equal to the injury caused by the debtor rather than any other sum 
owed by the debtor on a contractual basis.”89 Though Salvino’s conduct was 
intentional, his breach of the contract was not tortious and therefore his debt 
was dischargeable under the Code.90 
While the Supreme Court in Geiger managed to clarify one aspect of  
the § 523(a)(6) exception, the Court failed to answer the question of 
whether tortious conduct is a prerequisite for a debt to be nondischargeable 
under the section. This failure has led to competing interpretations by the 
Ninth and Fifth Circuits that have affected other areas of the law. The 
differing interpretations of § 523(a)(6) by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits of 
whether tortious conduct is required for a debt to be nondischargeable has 
resulted in state and federal common law having conflicting roles in 
understanding the exception. 
II. BANKRUPTCY LAW WITHIN THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
STATUTORY LANDSCAPE 
Since the Ninth and Fifth Circuit rules require differing reliance on state 
and federal common law, it is necessary to place § 523(a)(6) in the broader 
legal context and understand the competing authority of federal and state 
governments in establishing bankruptcy standards. The Code occupies a 
unique place in American jurisprudence in that it is federal law that allows 
the states to establish competing interpretations, especially concerning 
exemptions.91 Though bankruptcy law does allow for some state 
regulation,92 when there is a conflict between the federal and state laws, 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See id. at 592. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Friendly Fin. Serv. Mid-City, Inc. v. Modicue (In re Modicue), 926 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Salvino, 373 B.R. at 592. 
 91. For examples of such exemptions, see New York’s personal property exemption statute 
and Texas’ personal property exemption statute. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205 (McKinney 2009); TEX. 
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 2007). 
 92. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006) (defining property as “any property that is 
exempt under federal law . . . or state or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the  
petition . . .”). 
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federal law will govern.93 The federal government has authority to regulate 
bankruptcy as outlined in the Bankruptcy Clause, which gives the federal 
government the authority to enact “uniform [l]aws on the subject of 
[b]ankruptcies throughout the United States.”94 Despite this clear provision, 
there has been some debate over the proper scope of federal authority in 
bankruptcy. 
A. DEFINING THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STATE LAW IN 
BANKRUPTCY DETERMINATIONS 
Despite the fact that the Constitution clearly establishes the federal 
government as having authority concerning the enactment of uniform 
bankruptcy laws, the individual states have always had a role to play in 
bankruptcy.95 In Butner v. United States, the Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized the role of the states in bankruptcy determinations.96 The Court 
advocated limited federal authority in bankruptcy cases by representing the 
legal truism that unless there is conflicting federal regulation, state law 
governs.97 The Supreme Court espoused and established the notion that 
state bankruptcy laws are only preempted when there is actual conflict with 
the federal regulation provided by the Code.98 The dispute in Butner 
centered on competing claims for rents collected between the filing of 
bankruptcy and foreclosure between a bankruptcy trustee and a second 
mortgagee.99 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it did not intend 
to determine whether the state law was properly applied.100 Instead, the 
Court was concerned with whether the federal statutes that govern the 
administration of bankrupt estates were correctly interpreted.101 Since state 
law defines and creates property interests, unless there is “some federal 
interest [that] requires a different result, there is no reason why such 
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”102 The Court sought to ensure the 
uniform treatment of property within a state, regardless of whether the suit 
was in federal or state courts, “to reduce uncertainty . . . discourage forum 
shopping, and . . . prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by 
                                                                                                                 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 95. See, e.g., Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein (In re Hallenberg-Wagner Motor 
Co.), 119 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1941) (“In this circuit the law is settled that the construction of 
mortgages is governed by local state law.”). 
 96. See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
 97. See id. at 54. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 49. 
 100. Id. at 51. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 55. 
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reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”103 The Court in Butner held 
that “the federal bankruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary 
to ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the 
same protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy had 
ensued.”104 
Since Butner was decided,105 there has been movement in the federal 
bankruptcy courts to rely on federal common law for definitional purposes 
to ensure uniformity among the states.106 The basic premise of Butner holds 
true, but its scope has been limited to a definitional role, with the federal 
courts increasingly relying on federal common law, rather than state law, to 
settle any ambiguities in the Code.107 
B. THE SHIFT TO USING FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO DEFINE 
TERMS THAT ARE AT ISSUE 
While not directly contradicting the truism found in Butner, the Court 
in United States v. Craft shifted away from the dominance of state 
definitions in the application of federal bankruptcy law, and instead focused 
on using federal common law to define relevant terms.108 In Craft, the Court 
was concerned with “whether a tenant by the entirety possesses ‘property’ 
or ‘rights to property’ to which a federal tax lien may attach.”109 The Court 
determined that the tenant by the entirety possessed “property” or “rights to 
property” for the purposes of federal law, and while the state may make a 
different choice concerning state creditors, that choice is not binding on 
federal courts.110 Instead, federal courts should “look initially to state law to 
determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government 
seeks to reach, [and] then to federal law to determine whether the 
taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as property or rights to property 
within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”111 Craft did not 
completely reject the truism found in Butner, but instead, merely 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
 104. Id. at 56. 
 105. The decision in Butner has been superceded by the new bankruptcy code, however 
“Butner’s core principles remain ‘good law,’ as it has been re-articulated by the High Court since 
the advent of the Bankruptcy Code.” See In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 564 (2009). 
 106. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (“State law determines only 
which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of 
the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law.”). 
 107. See id. at 288 (state law definition of property rejected in favor of a definition from federal 
common law); see also Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 330 (2005) (state law is not even 
mentioned in the analysis when the Court is filling in blanks in the Bankruptcy Code). 
 108. See Craft, 535 U.S. at 288. 
 109. Id. at 276. 
 110. Id. at 288. 
 111. Id. at 278 (quoting Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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represented a movement toward the establishment of a federal common law 
defining the scope of the Code.112 
C. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN DETERMINING 
THE APPLICABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Expanding on the conception of a federal common law for definitional 
purposes as envisaged by Craft, the Supreme Court later firmly established 
that the question of whether a debt is dischargeable is a separate federal 
inquiry that should take place in bankruptcy court, not earlier in state court 
when the nondischargeability of debts is not at issue.113 In Archer v. 
Warner, the Warners agreed to pay the Archers in order to settle a fraud 
claim.114 However, after the Warners missed their first payment, they filed 
for bankruptcy.115 The Archers claimed that the Warners’ debt was 
nondischargeable because it was for money obtained by fraud.116 The 
bankruptcy court, district court, and the court of appeals denied the 
Archers’ claim and determined that the debt was dischargeable.117 The 
Supreme Court reversed stating that “the mere fact that a conscientious 
creditor has previously reduced his claim to judgment should not bar further 
inquiry into the true nature of the debt.”118 Archer definitively settled the 
issue that the bankruptcy court can weigh all evidence by looking beyond 
the record of state court proceedings when determining whether a debt is 
nondischargeable.119 Yet, in Rousey v. Jacoway, the Court did not expand 
on the notion of a federal common law existing for definitional purposes as 
Archer did. Instead, Rousey is merely a recent example of federal common 
law being applied to a bankruptcy exemption.120 The Court in Rousey asked 
“whether debtors can exempt assets in their Individual Retirement Accounts 
(“IRAs”) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E).”121 The  
§ 522(d)(10)(E) exemption allows a debtor to remove his right to receive “a 
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar 
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of 
service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and 
any dependent of the debtor” from the bankruptcy estate.122 The bankruptcy 
court, the bankruptcy appellate panel, and the court of appeals determined 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. at 288. 
 113. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 134 
(1979)). 
 114. Id. at 317. 
 115. Id. at 317–18. 
 116. Id. at 318. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 320–21 (quoting Brown, 442 U.S. at 138) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119. See id. at 321 (citing Brown, 442 U.S. at 138–39). 
 120. See generally Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 322. 
 122. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2006). 
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that the debtors’ right to payment did not meet all of the statutory factors. 
Therefore, the IRAs were not exempt from the bankruptcy proceedings.123 
The Supreme Court reversed and determined that IRAs could be exempted 
from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(d)(10)(E).124 
In the context of this note, Rousey is not important for the decision 
itself, but rather for how it was reached. When the Court determined that 
the exemption applied, the Court did not consider state law, relying on an 
analysis grounded in federal common law.125 Specifically the Court noted 
that the Code did not define the relevant terms, and looked “to the ordinary 
meaning of [those] terms” within the federal common law instead of state 
law.126 Rousey illustrates the scope of the Archer expansion by 
demonstrating that the application of federal common law extended beyond 
the applicability of bankruptcy law in general and instead is applicable in 
defining exemption terms. 
III. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES IN DECIDING THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
Though the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ interpretations necessitate 
different roles concerning the incorporation of federal and state common 
law into § 523(a)(6), the differing reliance on either federal or state 
common law does not make either interpretation fundamentally unsound. 
However, the Ninth Circuit rule is superior because it is more protective of 
debtors, is supported by the legislature’s drafting intent, and is not subject 
to abuse by creditors or debtors. 
A. NINTH CIRCUIT RULE AND THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW 
The Ninth Circuit rule concerning the nondischargeability of debts 
under § 523(a)(6) is a fundamentally sound statutory interpretation, but, 
since tortious conduct is not defined within the Code, there is conflict over 
whether state or federal common law should define the term.127 Depending 
on which standard is adopted, different conduct will be excepted from 
discharge under the Ninth Circuit rule. If courts apply the truism from 
Butner, state law will define what constitutes tortious conduct.128 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 324–25. 
 124. Id. at 326. 
 125. See id. at 327–32 (analyzing whether the debtor’s right to payment meets the requirements 
of the § 522(d)(10)(E) exception without invoking, or even mentioning state law, and instead 
relying on a purely federal analysis). 
 126. Id. at 330. 
 127. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006). 
 128. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 n.9 (1979) (“[S]tate laws are thus suspended only 
to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”). 
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if the courts apply the reasoning found in Craft or Archer, the courts will 
look to federal common law to define tortious conduct.129 
While the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution would 
generally govern this conflict of competing interpretations, a determination 
of what constitutes tortious conduct is an activity generally left to the 
states.130 Traditionally, states have been granted the authority to establish 
tort law because the determination of what constitutes tortious conduct is 
representative of a public policy decision to regulate.131 In addition to 
tradition, defining what conduct is tortious should be left to the states so as 
to ensure the uniform application of bankruptcy law by both state and 
federal courts within a state. This will reduce uncertainty over what conduct 
is exempted, discourage forum shopping by debtors and creditors, and 
prevent a party from being benefited because the action is a bankruptcy 
proceeding.132 
Furthermore, the federal definition of “tortious conduct” is 
inappropriate in the application of § 523(a)(6) because unlike Craft, there is 
no predefined common law since the Code does not define the term tortious 
conduct.133 And while Archer may expand on the federal definitional power 
found in Craft, it does so by requiring a federal inquiry in bankruptcy court 
when the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy is at issue.134 This inquiry 
does not require the application of state or federal common law to define a 
term, but merely ensures that bankruptcy courts weigh all of the evidence 
when determining if a debt is nondischargeable.135 Defining what 
constitutes tortious conduct must be done on the state level in order to 
ensure that local interests are represented in a uniform manner within the 
state.136 In turn, this will necessitate reliance on the Butner Court’s decision 
to incorporate state tort law into the Code. 
Following the Butner Court’s rationale may be disconcerting because it 
could lead to a different application and analysis of claims grounded in 
bankruptcy on a state-by-state basis. For example, in the hypothetical state 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 
(2002). 
 130. HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, FEDERAL TORT REFORM LEGISLATION: 
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SUMMARIES OF SELECTED STATUTES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
(July 7, 2008), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/ 
95797_07072008.pdf (“Tort law at present is almost exclusively state law rather than federal 
law.”). 
 131. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc’n, 844 P.2d 949, 974 (Utah 1992) (“The common law of 
tort expresses public policy . . . .”). 
 132. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006); see Craft, 535 U.S. at 283 (explaining that the language of 
26 U.S.C. § 6321 is broad and shows congressional intent to reach all the property a taxpayer may 
have). 
 134. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 321. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
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of Guntopia, suppose there is a law exempting all responsibility for harm 
caused by firing a gun on one’s own property. The Ninth Circuit rule, under 
the Butner standard, would allow someone who damaged another’s 
property, with a gun used on their own property, to avoid the debt.137 While 
this is an extreme example, it illustrates that reliance on the Butner standard 
could result in disparate treatment among the states for determining whether 
debts can be discharged in bankruptcy. Ultimately, this concern does not 
amount to much when one looks at how the Ninth Circuit rule has been 
applied. For example, in the Jercich decision, the court looked to California 
law to determine whether the nonpayment of wages by an employer was 
tortious conduct.138 Though adoption of the Ninth Circuit rule could lead to 
confusion over whether state law or federal common law defines tortious 
conduct, the traditional exertion of power by the state, coupled with the 
general adoption of state standards by the bankruptcy courts, means that the 
state law definition of tortious conduct would be adopted. 
While the requirement of tortious conduct being read into § 523(a)(6) 
could lead to conflict between state and federal law, the Butner truism 
effectively limits that conflict even when viewed in light of the expansive 
federal common law established by Craft and Archer. 
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT RULE AND THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit rule, the Fifth Circuit rule found in Williams 
invites the adoption of federal common law to define the terms. The Fifth 
Circuit rule requires that the “debtor must have acted with objective 
substantial certainty or subjective motive to inflict injury.”139 This test relies 
on definitional terms that can be uniformly adopted among the states, and 
therefore, there are no negative consequences with the adoption of a federal 
standard. The requirements of “objective substantial certainty” and 
“subjective motive” can be easily defined by federal common law so as to 
ensure uniformity in the application of bankruptcy law.140 Similar to the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. The injury to property that would occur from an individual firing a gun on their own 
property would be dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) even if the individual acted in a willful and 
malicious manner because the state has determined that the individual’s conduct is not 
blameworthy. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006). 
 138. See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Jett v. 
Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2005) (looking to California state law to 
determine that the libelous statements made by the debtor were tortious conduct making the 
damages nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)), amended by, No. 03-15610, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5919 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2005). 
 139. Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 140. The reason these terms can be adopted easily on a federal level is because they are terms of 
art that are used in a consistent manner among the states. The term “objective substantial 
certainty” is applied in the same manner by the Fifth Circuit and in a bankruptcy court in Ohio. 
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rationale by the Court in Rousey, the terms found in the Fifth Circuit test 
can be easily defined by looking to the ordinary meaning of those terms.141 
In addition to Rousey, the Court in Archer established that federal common 
law could be used to define terms in bankruptcy.142 The adoption of federal 
common law to define the terms found in the Fifth Circuit test is 
appropriate because of the uniform nature of the terms and the interest in 
establishing uniform application of the law among the states. 
While the Fifth Circuit rule embraces the modern trend of using federal 
common law in interpreting the Code, there is concern that the test is not 
fundamentally sound since it conflates the willful and malicious 
requirement. The Fifth Circuit, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Geiger, determined that § 523(a)(6) creates an implied malice 
standard, and that “[a] debtor acts with implied malice when he acts with 
the actual intent to cause injury.”143 While it is possible that the Fifth 
Circuit could rely on the vagueness of the statute to justify its implied 
malice standard, since the fact that the statute reads “willful and malicious” 
could be interpreted as meaning that the injury be both willful and 
malicious, the statute could also be disjunctive and refer to a “willful 
injury” or a “malicious injury” as being adequate for an exception from 
discharge. However, the conflation misconstrues both the nature and the 
plain language of the Geiger decision, which did not address whether the 
doctor’s conduct was malicious and merely focused on whether the doctor 
caused a willful injury to the patient.144 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit 
has noted, conflating the willful and malicious standards of § 523(a)(6) 
contravenes established precedent.145 Since the Supreme Court did not 
address the malicious requirement in Geiger, the Fifth Circuit has 
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 141. See Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 330 (2005). 
 142. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003). 
 143. In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 509 (quoting In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 144. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998). 
 145. Jett v. Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by, No. 03-
15610, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5919 (9th Cir. April 11, 2005). 
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misconstrued that case’s interpretation of § 523(a)(6) by conflating the 
willful and malicious standard into a single test.146 
The fact that the Ninth Circuit rule relies on state common law to define 
tortious conduct, and the Fifth Circuit rule relies on federal common law to 
define its terms does not affect the soundness of the rules. Though there 
could be some concern that the Ninth Circuit rule is an example of judicial 
rule making, this concern is unfounded because its interpretation can be 
reconciled with the statute’s legislative history and the rules of statutory 
construction.147 On the other hand, there is serious concern that the Fifth 
Circuit’s conflation of the willful and malicious injury requirement into a 
single test comes into conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Geiger 
and established precedent. Though this conflict does not make the Fifth 
Circuit rule fundamentally unsound, it does make the Ninth Circuit rule 
more attractive. 
C. PROTECTIVE OF DEBTORS 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit rule being a more attractive rule for 
constructionary reasons, the Ninth Circuit rule is also more protective of 
debtors. It is well established in the United States that the purpose of 
bankruptcy is “to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive 
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and 
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”148 The fresh start 
afforded to the honest debtor gives the debtor “a new opportunity in life and 
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.”149 However, the policy for relief in 
bankruptcy being accorded to the honest debtor is not absolute and “the 
fresh start [policy of the Code] does not extend to an in rem claim against 
property but is limited to a discharge of personal liability.”150 
                                                                                                                 
 146. It is possible, however, that the Supreme Court has implicitly approved of the Fifth 
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While it was clear as early as 1915 that the purpose of the Code was to 
give the honest debtor a fresh start,151 before the enactment of the Code 
reform in 1978 secured creditors were able to abuse the system at the 
debtors’ expense.152 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 took steps to 
prevent abuse by creditors and the wide-sweeping changes resulted in the 
Code having a pro-debtor bias.153 Yet, many of the amendments to the Code 
after 1978 have been passed to level the playing field, and even in some 
instances, favor creditors in bankruptcy.154 Despite “the policy winds 
hav[ing] turned angrily from the dew-dropping pro[-]debtor south to the 
frozen bosom of the pro[-]creditor north,”155 the fundamental purpose of the 
Code remains the same: to give the honest debtor a fresh start.156 
The Ninth Circuit rule is more protective of debtors and is more lenient 
in allowing them to discharge their debts in bankruptcy proceedings. As 
shown in Jercich and Salvino, the Ninth Circuit rule only prevents debts 
from being dischargeable when the debtor has intentionally and maliciously 
caused injury to the creditor through tortious conduct.157 By requiring 
tortious conduct in addition to a malicious and willful injury, the Ninth 
Circuit rule makes it harder for debtors to have their debts declared 
nondischargeable.158 In addition to being protective of debtors, the 
requirement of tortious conduct involves a determination of the debtor’s 
“honesty,” or his blameworthiness, thus making the rule congruent with the 
purpose of bankruptcy.159 For example, in Jercich, the debtor was 
“dishonest” because he breached California public policy in failing to pay 
the wages of one of his employees and therefore his debt was 
nondischargeable,160 while the debtor in Salvino was “honest” because an 
intentional breach of an employment contract was not a violation of Illinois 
public policy.161 The Ninth Circuit rule serves the fundamental purpose of 
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bankruptcy by protecting honest debtors and preventing dishonest debtors 
from discharging their debts.162 
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit rule that combines the willful and 
malicious injury requirement into a single determination of whether the 
debtor “acted with objective substantial certainty or subjective motive to 
inflict injury” is not protective of debtors.163 By conflating the willful and 
malicious requirements, the Fifth Circuit rule requires a single 
determination of whether a debtor’s conduct can be nondischargeable. In 
addition to the rule being easily satisfied, the Fifth Circuit rule does not 
make any attempt to distinguish between an honest and dishonest debtor.164 
By failing to incorporate any degree of blameworthiness into the 
determination, the Fifth Circuit rule is as likely to allow a dishonest debtor 
to discharge her debts as to prevent an honest debtor from doing so. 
While the Fifth Circuit rule provides debtors some protection by 
requiring intentional action on the part of the debtor, the Ninth Circuit rule 
is more protective by having multiple elements and a determination of 
blameworthiness through the requirement of tortious conduct. The Ninth 
Circuit rule is better because it is more protective of debtors in general, and 
more importantly, it makes an effort to protect honest debtors in accordance 
with the purpose of the Code. 
D. INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE 
Besides being more protective of debtors, the Ninth Circuit rule is more 
in line with the intent of the legislature and the rules of statutory 
construction. Concerning the passage of amendments to the Code, “[w]hen 
Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write on a clean slate.”165 
This means that modifications to the Code do not replace established case 
law; instead, amendments are understood in light of previous interpretations 
except where the common law is explicitly overruled.166 Further, when 
there is a dearth of discussion concerning a modification to existing case 
law in the legislative history, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
interpret an amendment to the Code that contradicts a pre-Code practice.167 
In practice, when a provision of the Code “is coherent and consistent, there 
generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206. 
 163. Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th 
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statute.”168 But, when interpreting a provision of the Code that is open to 
some interpretation, the court may look to legislative history and the pre-
Code practice.169 
Section 523(a)(6) may not be facially ambiguous, but given the 
divergent treatment among the circuits, it is necessary to look at earlier 
practice and the legislative history to determine whether tortious conduct is 
required.170 Looking at the practice of the judiciary before § 523(a)(6) was 
added to the Code, the Ninth Circuit rule is more in line with past practice. 
Before § 523(a)(6) was codified in 1978, § 17(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 had a willful and malicious injury exception from discharge that 
applied only where there was tortious conduct.171 By voluntarily reenacting 
the willful and malicious injury requirement for nondischargeability from 
the old § 17(a)(8) into § 523(a)(6), it is safe to assume that Congress 
intended to continue limiting the application of this exception to tortious 
conduct.172 This assumption comes from the fact that “Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change.”173 Since the language of the old bankruptcy exception found in  
§ 17(a)(8) is the same as the current language found in  
§ 523(a)(6),174 unless there is contrary language in the legislative history the 
requirement of tortious conduct will continue unabated.175 Additionally, 
when a common law principle is firmly established, like the requirement of 
tortious conduct to invoke the willful and malicious injury exception, “the 
courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation 
that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary 
is evident.”176 
Looking to the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit rule is congruent 
with established rules of statutory construction. The legislative history of  
§ 523(a)(6) merely discusses that the Supreme Court’s ruling in a prior case 
had been overruled.177 Therefore, “willful” means intentional or 
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deliberate.178 However, there is nothing in the legislative history  suggesting 
that the scope of the § 523(a)(6) exception has been expanded to cover 
claims of malicious and willful injury that do not involve an independent 
tort action.179 Further, when discussing the modifications to  
§ 523 generally, the legislative discussion makes no mention of  
§ 523(a)(6),180 and where there is no discussion it is likely that the pre-Code 
practice is still applicable.181 Since there is no discussion in the legislative 
history of modifying § 523(a)(6) to cover claims of malicious and willful 
injury that do not involve an independent tort action, the Ninth Circuit rule 
should be adopted. 
It is necessary to look at the pervasiveness of past practice and 
legislative history to determine whether the prior practice is still the current 
rule under the Code, because the modification of the Code does not occur 
on a clean slate.182 Past practice will govern unless there is clear intent 
either in the statute or in the legislative history to overrule the past 
practice.183 When Congress adopted the language of § 17(a)(8) without 
modifying it or discussing changes, the case law requiring tortious conduct 
for a debt to be nondischargeable still governed. Since the Fifth Circuit rule 
does not require tortious conduct and the Ninth Circuit rule does, the Ninth 
Circuit rule is more harmonious with the rules of legislative history and 
statutory construction. 
E. ABUSE BY THE DEBTOR AND THE CREDITOR 
Beyond being more protective of debtors and more in line with 
legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit rule cannot be as easily manipulated by 
either party for an unfair advantage while the Fifth Circuit rule can be easily 
abused by a creditor. While the underlying purpose of the Code, in allowing 
the honest debtor to start afresh, is pro-debtor,184 bankruptcy does not 
unduly favor debtors at the expense of creditors.185 Given this dichotomy, it 
becomes necessary to interpret the Code in such a manner that creditors do 
not lose their rights but debtors are protected in accordance with the 
purpose of the Code.186 Although it is true that the balancing of debtors and 
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creditors rights in an equitable manner can result in abuse of the system, the 
fact that bankruptcy is an alternative avenue for the vindication of legal 
rights exacerbates the possibility of forum shopping.187 
Since “[t]here is no virtue in giving parties an incentive to engage in 
forum shopping for its own sake,” it becomes necessary to establish 
exception rules that do not encourage pursuing an action in bankruptcy over 
other legitimate legal avenues.188 One method of limiting forum shopping in 
bankruptcy is to ensure that debtor/creditor rights outside of bankruptcy 
match those rights within bankruptcy.189 By keeping the rights in 
bankruptcy and alternative legal avenues congruent, the ability of parties to 
misbehave is severely limited.190 This method is superior to granting judges 
discretion to police the conduct of parties since judges are human, and 
therefore, prone to error.191 By establishing congruent policies in and out of 
bankruptcy, courts can limit forum shopping and other abuses by parties. 
The Ninth Circuit rule limits opportunities to forum shop by ensuring 
that legal rights that are protected outside of bankruptcy are protected 
during bankruptcy proceedings. By exempting tortious conduct from 
discharge, the Ninth Circuit rule establishes a bankruptcy policy grounded 
in legal rights. This congruent policy in the context of § 523(a)(6) ensures 
that violators of public policy are held responsible for the harm they 
cause.192 By ensuring that violators of public policy are responsible for the 
harm they cause no matter what the legal proceeding, the Ninth Circuit rule 
does not provide an incentive for the debtor to enter into bankruptcy and 
gives the creditor no reason to force the debtor into bankruptcy.193 Since the 
Ninth Circuit rule ensures congruence between rights in and out of 
bankruptcy, the rule is appropriately classified as a neutral rule into and out 
of bankruptcy.194 
Though the Ninth Circuit rule ensures congruent analysis of conduct, 
there is concern that in practice a dishonest debtor might be able to abuse 
the rule to avoid his obligations to his creditor. For example, allowing the 
doctor in Salvino to avoid the debts arising out of his intentional breach of 
contract seems to be an abuse of the Code, since it allows a dishonest debtor 
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to swindle his creditor and escape his obligations.195 Despite the doctor’s 
dishonesty, his conduct is more correctly classified as an intentional breach 
of contract done to offset further economic loss.196 The doctor’s conduct 
may have been underhanded, but it was merely a breach of an agreement 
between private parties and did not implicate the public policy concerns 
underlying tort law.197 Since Salvino did not violate any public policy in 
breaching his contract,198 he is not blameworthy, and therefore is an honest 
debtor who is entitled to protection under the Code.199 
By requiring tortious conduct for a debt to be nondischargeable under  
§ 523(a)(6), the Ninth Circuit rule is firmly grounding willful and malicious 
injury in tort law. By doing so, the Ninth Circuit is ensuring that each 
challenge to the dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(6) will be decided 
on a case-by-case basis after a careful weighing of objective standards that 
does not allow either the debtor or the creditor to use bankruptcy to their 
own advantage at the expense of the other party.200 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit rule is not neutral concerning forum 
shopping and has the effect of encouraging creditors to force debtors into 
bankruptcy. This incentive results from the lack of a requirement of tortious 
conduct in the determination of whether a debt is nondischargeable because 
of a willful and malicious injury.201 Without the tortious conduct exception, 
creditors who lack a valid tort claim, or whose judgment would be limited 
in normal proceedings, have an incentive to push debtors into bankruptcy to 
ensure payment. This incentive results because the Fifth Circuit rule is 
easily satisfied and is sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of 
misconduct, including intentional breaches of contract.202 For example, 
under the Fifth Circuit rule, Salvino would have been unable to discharge 
the debts resulting from the breach of his employment contract since he 
intended, or was substantially certain, to injure the creditor.203 A creditor 
under the Fifth Circuit rule would have the incentive to force a debtor like 
Salvino into bankruptcy, so as to limit his remedies and ensure a prompt 
judgment for payment. 
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The Ninth Circuit rule is neutral as to the issue of forum shopping 
because it ensures equal treatment of parties in and out of bankruptcy 
proceedings, thus ensuring that neither party will seek the bankruptcy arena 
in search of a windfall.204 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit rule does not 
mandate similar application of the law within bankruptcy and other legal 
proceedings resulting in an incentive for creditors to engage in forum 
shopping.205 The Ninth Circuit’s rule is superior to the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach because, instead of merely giving judges additional authority to 
police abuses, it eliminates incentives to engage in forum shopping.206 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit rule requiring tortious conduct for a debt to be 
nondischargeable should be universally adopted since it is more protective 
of debtors, more consistent with the legislative history of the statute, can be 
reconciled with the rules of statutory construction, and is less likely to result 
in forum shopping by both the debtor and the creditor. As Bankruptcy 
Judge Wedoff notes in Salvino, the use of the phrase “willful and malicious 
injury” suggests that the exception is limited to tortious conduct, that the 
legislative history seems to necessitate a finding of a tortious conduct 
requirement, that without a tortious conduct requirement the exception 
would become too broad and contravene the purpose of the Code, and that 
there would be conflicts between clauses of the Code if tortious conduct 
was not required.207 Interpreting § 523(a)(6) to require tortious conduct is 
more protective of debtors because it is more difficult to satisfy and is 
harmonious with the overarching purpose of the Code.208 This interpretation 
is also more consistent with the intent of the legislature because past 
practice and the rules of statutory construction necessitate a finding that 
tortious conduct is required to invoke the willful and malicious injury 
exception.209 The Ninth Circuit rule will result in less forum shopping by 
either party as it ensures the equal application of law whether the action is a 
bankruptcy proceeding or not.210 Since the fundamental purpose of the Code 
is to allow the honest debtor to start afresh211 and the Ninth Circuit clearly 
fulfills that function, it should be universally adopted throughout the United 
States. 
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